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It was a dark and stormy night. A man in robes wandered along a 
drafty corridor, distracted by the bloody business at hand. He was 
planning to commit a grievous wrong against a friend and kinsman, 
but his heart and mind were at odds. The winds howled outside the 
walls. Sudden light illuminated his passage. 
 
This is a ghost story. And, like all ghost stories, it strikes us as immediately familiar. As 
Shakespeare’s heirs, we know the story well, but from where? Is that Macbeth we see before us, 
his hand on Duncan’s door? Or do we spy on Brutus, reading a cryptic message in his balmy 
Mediterranean orchard? ‘Speak, strike, redress.’ The lightning suddenly becomes a meteor 
shower raining down on Rome. Perhaps we still misread—we see not Macbeth, nor Brutus, but 
Tarquin, the last Roman prince, stealing into Collatine’s room to rape his wife. The light dims to 
a candle flame—but only for a moment, until it falls prey to a cold tongue of midnight air. 
The dark and stormy night rages in Scotland and in Rome; the robed figure is indeed 
Macbeth, but also Brutus. Tarquin is there, too, in all three places: at Inverness and in Brutus’ 
orchard, in Collatine’s house as an actor but also a specter, ghosted from history, earlier plays, 
and our memories. Tarquin’s specter haunts Shakespearean tragedy, always accompanied by a 
series of objects acting in uncanny ways;1 in a study of his appearances, the desire to glean 
information about the human actors from the supporting roles played by the (supposedly) 
inanimate world tugs insistently. In such a reading, the tempests raging out-of-doors provide the 
backdrop for Tarquin’s (Brutus’, Macbeth’s) journeys. The storms without echo the storms 
within, the macrocosm mirrors the microcosm, and so on. Cultural theorist Julian Yates observes 
that, “the object [is] useful to us only insofar as it offers news of ourselves, news that we marshal 
to tell our own story” (5). For four centuries, we have read this way, dissecting Shakespeare’s 
tragic protagonists backwards, opening first their souls, then their minds, and, finally, their 
bodies to our critical gaze. For four centuries, we have fed this anthropocentric myth of history, 
rendered nature a mute witness to our achievements, our downfalls, our comedies, our tragedies. 
“We have lost the world,” sighs Michel Serres, “we’ve transformed things into fetishes or 
commodities, the stakes of our stratagems” (29). We have perpetuated the fiction of an 
environment, which, in Serres’ words, “assumes that we humans are at the center of a system of 
nature” (33). More recent scholarship implores us to rethink the reading and writing of history 
and explore alternative histories, especially the histories of nature, of objects, of things.  
Unlike proponents of material culture studies who reverse the focus from humans to 
things, the sociologist Bruno Latour urges us to create a ‘Parliament of Things’ wherein we place 
objects and actors from the natural world at the center of discourse. From this vantage point, we 
“see things from the point of view of the known, not the knowing” (qtd. in Yates xviii). In other 
words, according to Yates, our aim could be “to retell our stories and reimagine our communities 
as collectives of human and nonhuman actors” (8). Here, I intend to take up Yates’ challenge and 
focus on the winds that blow during these blustery nights, to put the ‘dark and stormy’ on the 
dissection table and see how, when we move nature to the center and place us at the periphery, 
we can figure ‘collective agency’ in Shakespearean drama (Shohet 101).2 Such an enterprise 
necessitates acknowledgment of the uncanny nature of agentive objects, for objects moving of 
their own accord pose a threat to the humans who work so diligently to master them. When told 
by a human subject, the story of the object, according to Yates, “makes for a melancholy tale—a 
ghost story perhaps, in which the object occasionally assumes the guise of a subject in order to 
wreak its own, invariably tragic, form of revenge” (7). In Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece, 
Julius Caesar, and Macbeth, nature presents such a compelling case for individuated attention 
that it cannot be ignored. In these texts, as nowhere else in Shakespeare’s work, nature actively 
resists the silence that has so long been imposed on it by humankind.3 I wish here to examine the 
ways in which agentive objects attempt to speak to us, and for us, in Lucrece, Caesar, and 
Macbeth, and to listen to their messages as the tragic figures in each story fail to do. 
The Rape of Lucrece tells the story of Tarquin, the son of Tarquinius Superbus, the last 
king of Rome. The prince hears his friend Collatine praising his wife Lucrece’s beauty and 
chastity, upon which he leaves his fellow soldiers and begs hospitality of the gracious Lucrece. 
That night, Tarquin makes his way to Lucrece’s bedchamber, pausing as he walks to reflect on 
the evil that he hopes to commit. After a brief struggle between his morals and his biology, 
Tarquin decides that “desire [his] pilot is, beauty [his] prize” (279).4 Although able to convince 
himself that his passions should direct his actions, Tarquin encounters a series of uncanny 
objects that prevent his passage through Lucrece’s darkened hallway. Things come to life in 
Lucrece’s house, clearly intending to prevent her rape. As Tarquin eases open the door to her 
chamber, the locks creak loudly [“But as they open they all rate his ill” (304)] and “the threshold 
grates the door to have him heard” (306). The weasels that patrol the castle in search of rodents 
“shriek to see [Tarquin] there” (307) and a breeze forces its way inside to put out Tarquin’s light: 
“Through little vents and crannies of the place / The wind wars with his torch to make him stay, / 
And blows the smoke of it into his face, / Extinguishing his conduct in this case” (310-13). The 
wind not only performs a deliberate action here but does so with a specific purpose: thwarting 
Tarquin’s entry into Lucrece’s room.  
Thus, the natural world becomes not only agentive but also intentive. Immediately after 
the wind extinguishes Tarquin’s torch, Lucrece’s sewing glove proffers a new, more violent 
warning: “the needle his finger pricks” (319). The syntax privileges the needle as the sentence’s 
actor: Tarquin is not passively wounded by a needle; a needle pricks Tarquin.5 Further, the 
needle’s agency joins not just intention but also vocal expression, as it reports: “This glove to 
wanton tricks / Is not inured. Return again in haste. / Thou seest our mistress’ ornaments are 
chaste” (320-22). A speaking needle presents us with an eerily animated object, one that chooses 
to communicate with the living. Natural and non-natural things might have their own language 
(locks creak, doors stick, weasels shriek), but this needle also boasts fluency in ours. Its message 
is clear enough, but Tarquin, given ample opportunity to heed the needle’s 
(locks’/weasels’/floor’s/wind’s) advice, misreads it. Instead, “he in the worst sense consters their 
denial. / The doors, the wind, the glove that did delay him / He takes for accidental things of 
trial” (424-26). Moreover, Tarquin decides, their ounce of prevention only increases his lust for 
Lucrece, “like little frosts that sometime threat the spring / To add a more rejoicing to the prime” 
(431-32). The tragedy stems from Tarquin’s inability to read the signs; like all humans who 
uphold Yates’ “fiction of phenomenologically distinct categories [which] enable our use of the 
world,” he silences by inattention the voice of nature, rendering it a mute witness to his crime. 
Because of his inability to figure history collectively with nature, Tarquin thinks of 
himself and Lucrece in explicitly natural terms, as if to say that if nature refuses to be complicit 
in his crime, he will replace things with humans. By overlaying his actions on those of the 
natural world, he sanctions them as somehow ‘natural’. His “will backed with resolution” (352), 
Tarquin enters Lucrece’s bedchamber and looks upon “the dove sleep[ing] fast that this night-
owl will catch” (360). In the ensuing stanzas, Lucrece sustains comparisons to the sun, the moon, 
a host of different flowers, grass, and ‘a new-killed bird’ (457); Tarquin, on the other hand, acts 
like a ‘grim lion’ (421), a falcon, a cockatrice and a griffin. Predictably, Tarquin always emerges 
as a predator, with Lucrece posing alternately as his prey and as the landscape against which his 
carnivores roam. 
In attempting to replace nature with himself and Lucrece, Tarquin perverts the natural 
order, rendering nature mute once again, and “transforms the world into an object of use” (Yates 
2). The agentive objects do indeed become tragic figures, then, as Yates suggests, their intended 
vengeance thwarted and their agency disabled. The objects will have their day, however; they 
will seek their revenge in other gloomy hallways, on other dark and stormy nights. And they will 
employ the ghost of Tarquin, now long dead, for their spectral purposes. They will haunt the 
disjointed time and transform Tarquin into an object of use. 
Tarquin-as-object makes his first appearance in Titus Andronicus, printed in 1594, the 
same year as The Rape of Lucrece. Here, Tarquin figures merely as a historical precedent, 
contributing to what Katharine Eisaman Maus in the Norton Shakespeare calls Shakespeare’s 
“Rome effect” (372). Titus and Lucius invoke Tarquin specifically because of his Romanness, as 
a literary exemplar of abuses of power. Titus takes place in a crumbling empire, just before 
Rome falls to the Visigoths, so Shakespeare draws on a figure that represents a disintegrating 
Rome: Tarquin’s rape of Lucrece precipitated his father’s deposal and the establishment of the 
Republic. Tarquin the Proud was hated by his people and a notorious tyrant, and his name, not 
his son’s, first appears in Titus. As Lucius prepares to leave Rome to gather forces against 
Saturninus, he channels his namesake, Lucius Junius Brutus, the man who led the rebel factions 
against the Tarquins. “If Lucius live,” he vows, “he will requite your wrongs / And make proud 
Saturnine and his empress / Beg at the gates like Tarquin and his queen” (295-97).  
Shortly thereafter, the violated Lavinia reports her rape to the Andronicii, but unlike her 
similarly mutilated precedent, Philomel, she cannot weave her sad tale into a tapestry.6 Her 
father exhorts her to find a way to name her accuser: “[Say] what Roman lord it was durst do the 
deed. / Or slunk not Saturnine, as Tarquin erst, / That left the camp to sin in Lucrece’ bed?” (61-
63). Titus compares Saturninus to both Tarquins, father and son, implying that Saturninus has 
sinned against Rome as both a tyrant and a rapist and that his actions will dismantle the Empire. 
The figures of Tarquin the Proud and Tarquin the prince thus collapse into a single emblematic 
figure in their transfer to Shakespeare’s fictional emperor. Tarquin becomes in Titus Andronicus 
a thing, a metaphor, a specter to be invoked by future regicides.  
Significantly, the Tarquin-thing that stands for both tyranny and sexual/ized violence 
visits Shakespeare’s tragic heroes alongside the playwright’s three most compelling examples of 
agentive objects.7 First, The Rape of Lucrece involves Tarquin as a human actor and (because it 
is always already ghosted for a twenty-first century reader) invokes the conflated Tarquin-thing 
as symbol. Second, he surfaces in Julius Caesar when Brutus struggles with the decision to join 
the conspiracy against Caesar; and third, he turns up in Macbeth, when the thane slaughters 
Duncan on his way to claim the Scottish throne. 
Two of the most striking images in Julius Caesar both contain agentive objects: the storm 
that menaces the conspirators and Caesar’s assassination. In the first instance, things (comets, 
lions, winds) become active, actors; in the second, a person (Caesar) becomes a thing, a non-
actor (‘thou bleeding piece of earth’). Both moments script the complex interactions between 
humans and things and demonstrate a bi-directional flow of labor. Gail Kern Paster discusses the 
early modern body as a semi-permeable container, open to and interacting with the elements. She 
quotes Shigehisa Kuriyama as writing, “The history of the body is ultimately a history of ways of 
inhabiting the world” (Paster 116). From our seat at the table in the ‘Parliament of Things’, we 
might say rather that the history of the world is ultimately a history of ways of hosting the body. 
For Serres, this parasitism “follows the simple arrow of a flow moving in one direction but not 
the other, in the exclusive interest of the parasite” (36). While humans have certainly acted as 
parasites for most of our history, we have only constructed this history of uni-directional transfer. 
As Yates would have it, history is most honestly figured as a “complex division of labor among 
humans and nonhumans” (8), a recovery that calls for the establishment of an “ethics of 
reciprocation” (xviii).  
Act 1, scene 3 of Caesar depicts a fearsome tempest afflicting Rome, when “all the sway 
of the earth / Shakes like a thing infirm” (3-4). Casca trembles under a sky ‘dropping fire’ and 
tells of a man whose hands were engulfed in flames but unharmed. During the day, Casca had 
seen owls (‘the bird of night’) in the market and lions walking through the Capitol. “Let not men 
say / ‘These are their reasons,’” he says to Cicero, “‘they are natural,’ / For I believe they are 
portentious things / Unto the climate that they point upon” (29-32). Cicero replies that Casca 
may be making too much of the events, however strange. He warns, “Men may construe things 
after their fashion, / Clean from the purpose of the things themselves” (34-35). Although Cicero 
tries to be skeptical, his pronouncement reveals nature’s prior intentions.8 
Brutus notices the ‘strange impatience of the heavens’ as well; as he puzzles out the 
message sent by Cassius—‘Speak, strike, redress’—he acknowledges that the luminosity and 
frequency of the falling meteors make lamps unnecessary: “The exhalations whizzing in the air / 
Give so much light that I may read by them” (2.1.44-45). Notably, Brutus refers to the meteor 
shower as ‘exhalations,’ as though the sky breathes fire upon the earth. His description indicates 
the sky’s intent and attributes its actions to functions of the human body. Like Tarquin, however, 
Brutus dismisses this powerful portent, preferring to liken his observations to a fantasy: 
“Between the acting of a dreadful thing / And the first motion, all the interim is / Like a 
phantasma or a hideous dream” (63-65). Unfortunately for the insomniac Brutus, his life can 
neither be nor contain such dreams.  
In Act 2, another bout of sleeplessness grips Brutus. He complains of the “watchful 
cares” that “interpose themselves / Betwixt my eyes and night” (2.1.98-99), which are his 
deliberations on the assassination of Caesar. Brutus feels disturbed by his own intentions 
because, as he admits, he “know[s] no personal cause to spurn at him” (2.1.11). He fears that 
Caesar will become ambitious, although he has exhibited no sign of tyranny: “And to speak truth 
of Caesar, / I have not known when his affections swayed / More than his reason” (2.1.19-21). 
Historical precedent and that old trickster, rumor, teach Brutus that men may change upon 
becoming great: “So Caesar may. / Then lest he may, prevent” (2.1.27-28). Brutus convinces 
himself of Caesar’s despotic potential while all evidence points to the contrary. “Therefore,” he 
says, “think him as a serpent’s egg, / Which, hatched, would as his kind grow mischievous, / And 
kill him in the shell” (2.1.32-34). Brutus deliberately misreads Caesar’s character and intentions, 
revealing his ambition and his own peculiar brand of tyranny—that he is willing to emphasize 
faults a man does not possess in order to rationalize his execution. 
Just after this, Brutus’ servant Lucius turns over to him a letter that he discovered under 
the window of Brutus’ private chamber. He reads the note, sent by Cassius, in the meteor-light; it 
reads, “Brutus, thou sleep’st. Awake, and see thyself. / Shall Rome, et cetera? Speak, strike, 
redress” (46-47). Into this cryptic and abbreviated message, Brutus must insert his own meaning. 
To do this, he ‘pieces out’ that all of Rome calls him to assassinate Caesar, thus formulating his 
private wishes as duties done in service to the Republic. “Shall Rome, et cetera?” becomes 
“Shall Rome stand under one man’s awe?” (2.1.52). Clearly, this reflects Brutus’ grievance, not 
Rome’s. “Am I entreated / To speak and strike? O Rome, I make thee promise, / If the redress 
will follow, thou receivest / Thy full petition at the hand of Brutus” (2.1.55-58). He imagines his 
personal complaint to be a national protest and his murderous desires to be an exhortation from 
the people. He has an inborn duty to rid Rome of tyrants, just as his “ancestors did from the 
streets of Rome / The Tarquin drive when he was called a king” (2.1.53-54).  
Enter Tarquin, just at the moment of fatal misreading. In trying to convince himself of an 
imagined duty, Brutus calls upon Tarquin for assistance. No Roman could argue against the 
destruction of the Tarquin dynasty, no Roman could fault Brutus for bringing down the Caesar-
turned-Tarquin. Thus, Brutus employs Tarquin as the emblem of tyranny and oppression, 
solidifying the need for Caesar’s assassination. It is in his blood to do this thing; it haunts him to 
the point of not sleeping; it has inspired in him “the nature of an insurrection” (2.1.69). Brutus 
cannot see what Tarquin actually represents here—Brutus’ cold premeditation, his baseless 
accusations, and his suspect reading skills. As Casca desperately tries to explain to Cassius, the 
world wars with the conspirators; the heavens are raining fire, owls are hooting at noon, and 
lions are whelping in the streets—all because of Brutus’ and Cassius’ unnatural plans. The storm 
should warn to them to cease their plotting and avoid perverting the natural order, but both 
Brutus and Cassius fail to heed the warning signs. Cassius bares his breast to the lightning and 
Brutus simply seems grateful for the extra light by which he (mis)reads. The comparison of 
Caesar to Tarquin rings so obviously false that we cannot help but understand it as Brutus’ 
inability to see the tragedy implicit in his plans. 
The agentive and intentive natural world attempts to rescue the conspirators from their 
destruction, but Brutus and Cassius turn their heads. Interestingly, just as Tarquin conscripts 
nature to silence and imposes his subjectivity onto the landscape, Brutus and Cassius 
immediately render Caesar an object. They must think of him as inanimate in order to rationalize 
the assassination, for if they were to admit to his subjectivity, they would have to recognize his 
humanity and goodness. Therefore, we hear Brutus describing Caesar as a piece of meat: “Let’s 
carve him as a dish fit for the gods, / Not hew him as a carcass fit for hounds” (2.1.473-74). 
Brutus’ ideal murder does not come to pass, as the conspirators stab Caesar many more times 
than necessary and then paint their arms with his blood. Theirs is no holy enterprise, but a 
beastly slaughter. Even Mark Antony cannot for long remember that the corpse on the Senate 
floor used to be Caesar; when he enters to address him, he says, “O mighty Caesar! Dost thou lie 
so low?” (2.1.149), but shortly afterwards can muster only, “thou bleeding piece of earth” 
(3.1.257). He sees the body as “the ruins of the noblest man / That ever lived in the tide of times” 
(3.1.259-60). Strangely, as Antony addresses Caesar’s corpse, unable to afford it subjectivity, he 
also imagines that the corpse addresses him. Caesar’s wounds, he says, “like dumb mouths do 
ope their ruby lips / To beg the voice and utterance of my tongue” (3.1.263-64). Caesar has 
become a thing, a “bleeding piece of earth,” but this thing-that-was-Caesar acquires its own 
agency and intent, however silent.9 Julius Caesar enacts quite clearly the constant and multi-
directional metamorphoses undergone by people and things and people-become-things in a 
history constructed by collective agency. 
Shakespeare recycles the ‘dark and stormy night’ trope for Macbeth, where nature (and 
its opposite) remains a central metaphor. From the very first scene of the play, we know that 
nature and time are out of joint; the weird sisters tell us that “fair is foul and foul is fair” and 
describe the “foggy” and “filthy” air (1.1.10-11). Later, in Act II, Banquo indicates that the sky 
lacks visible stars: “There’s husbandry in heaven,” he says; “their candles are all out” (2.1.4-5). 
He wonders if the mysterious darkness holds greater portents, as he, like Brutus, suffers from 
troubled sleep. The night Macbeth kills Duncan, people notice great perturbations in nature. A 
conversation between an old man and Ross reveals the extent to which the natural order has been 
reversed. Night’s blackness obliterates the daylight, owls eat hawks, and Duncan’s horses turn on 
one another and become cannibals. Ross denotes these changes as “unnatural, / Even like the 
deed that’s done” (2.4.10-11). His words indicate that the macrocosm indeed reflects the 
microcosm, but Ross has not had a singular experience of the storm. Lennox, for example, 
narrates his contrasting observations to Macbeth: 
 The night has been unruly. Where we lay 
 Our chimneys were blown down, and, as they say, 
 Lamentings heard i’th’ air, strange screams of death,  
 And prophesying with accents terrible 
 Of dire combustion and confused events 
 New-hatched to th’ woeful time. The obscure bird 
 Clamoured the livelong night. Some say the earth 
 Was feverous and did shake. (2.3.50-57) 
Macbeth nonchalantly agrees: “‘Twas a rough night” (2.3.57). The unnatural events reported by 
Ross and the old man speak to disorder in the universe, certainly, but Lennox attributes agency to 
nature—voices in the air scream and make prophesies. Nature fights to regain its voice, to rebel 
against the silence imposed upon it by man, in the form of screeching winds and a Babel-like 
confusion of dialects. 
 As in Lucrece and Caesar, nature in Macbeth seems to choose as its moment for 
vengeance a major political upheaval. Perhaps in these times, nature more easily acquires agency 
because the world is in disarray, the time is out of joint. If this is so, then agentive objects may 
properly be termed specters, according to Derrida’s formulations.10 They appear when the time is 
out of joint, they issue an injunction to set the time right, and they are often the impetus for or 
furtherance of a conspiracy.11 The animals and inanimate actors in Lucrece, the meteor showers 
in Caesar, and the prophesying wind in Macbeth all seem bent on issuing not so much an 
injunction as a warning to the offending person. As specters, they necessarily remain silent, but 
appropriate the voice of a character who speaks in the dominant language of the court—in 
Lucrece, the narrator; in Caesar, Casca; and in Macbeth, Lennox. 
 An unnatural specter joins Macbeth as well, in addition to the ‘natural’ (though eerie) 
prescient winds and ‘supernatural’ weird sisters. In 2.1, Macbeth encounters a ghostly object in 
the passageway before Duncan’s bedchamber. “Is this a dagger which I see before me, / The 
handle toward my hand?” Macbeth asks rhetorically. “Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible / To 
feeling as to sight? Or art thou but / A dagger of the mind, a false creation / Proceeding from the 
heat-oppressed brain?” (2.1.33-34; 36-39). He correctly assumes that the dagger represents a 
projection of his inner thoughts and intentions, but things go awry when the dagger refuses to 
disappear. “I see thee still,” he says, “And on thy blade and dudgeon gouts of blood, / Which was 
not so before” (45-47). Although Macbeth guesses the dagger’s internal origins, he misses its 
point. He assumes it intends to provide moral support: “Thou marshall’st me the way that I was 
going, / And such an instrument I was to use” (42-43). If his assumptions are correct and the 
dagger means to build up his courage, why does it douse itself in blood and gore? It seems more 
plausible that the dagger appears as a warning; it is, indeed, “the bloody business which informs / 
Thus to [Macbeth’s] eyes,” but it intends to prevent rather than instigate. Like Tarquin before 
him, who chose to read the squeaky locks, screeching weasels, blustery winds, and pricking 
needles as bolsterers of passion, Macbeth chooses to read the dagger as confirmation of his plan, 
just when his courage was beginning to falter. Like Brutus, who filled in the blanks of a 
mysterious message with the encouragement he needed to find there, Macbeth reads the blood 
and gore on the knife blade as a portent of things to come, rather than as a scare tactic. His 
tragedy, then, replays Tarquin’s and Brutus’. 
 If Macbeth is truly a tragedy of misreading, complete with agentive objects, we would 
expect to see Tarquin’s name mentioned, to see his specter lurking behind the visor, always 
already watching us and waiting for his cue. We would not be disappointed. Macbeth invokes 
Tarquin, not simply as a historical precedent for tyrannicide, but also as an emblem of stealth and 
the successful commission of a hideous deed. He names himself ‘withered murder’ and creeps 
toward Duncan’s room with a familiar name on his lips: “With Tarquin’s ravishing strides, 
towards his design / Moves like a ghost” (2.1.55-56). Macbeth finds, unfortunately, a kindred 
spirit in Tarquin. When Brutus invoked Tarquin, he did so to rationalize the deposal of a good 
ruler in the event that he might turn against the Roman people, even though he had no evidence 
that it would happen. Similarly, Macbeth knows too well Duncan’s generosity and peacefulness: 
“This Duncan / Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been / So clear in his great office, that his 
virtues / Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued against / The deep damnation of his taking-off” 
(1.7.16-20). Like Tarquin, Macbeth acknowledges the consequences of his evil, but chooses to 
proceed regardless, using Tarquin as a role model rather than a cautionary tale.  
Significantly, Macbeth is denied sleep after the murder of Duncan, for he believes he has 
murdered sleep itself—”innocent sleep, / Sleep that knits up the ravelled sleave of care” (2.2.34-
35). He claims that he heard a ghostly voice tell him that “Glamis hath murdered sleep, and 
therefore Cawdor / Shall sleep no more. Macbeth shall sleep no more” (40-41). Sleep, it seems, 
remains inextricably tied to spectrality, perhaps because good sleep indicates an untroubled soul, 
or a time that is not out of joint. Frustrated at Macbeth’s refusal to frame the groomsman, Lady 
Macbeth chides him, saying, “The sleeping and the dead / Are but as pictures” (2.2.51-52), thus 
completing the transformation of Duncan from subject to object, from person to thing. 
 Macbeth’s guilt again gets the better of him when he sees the ghost of Banquo at a feast. 
The ghost must exhort him to something, although if he speaks at all, his lines are not shared 
with the audience. Macbeth relates his message to his wife: “Blood will have blood. / Stones 
have been known to move, and trees to speak, / Augurs and understood relations have / By 
maggot-pies and choughs and rooks brought forth / The secret’st man of blood” (3.5.121-25). 
Once again, specters appear to issue their injunction and accompany agentive objects—here, 
Macbeth’s imagined talking stones. The ghost of Banquo warns Macbeth that he will exact 
revenge, and the weird sisters later warn him that he will die when “Birnam Wood to high 
Dunsinane Hill / Shall come against him” (4.1.108-09). Predictably, Macbeth refuses to heed 
nature’s prophesy, and when he sees the trees of Birnam Wood advancing upon Dunsinane, he 
misreads the signs again. His tragedy ends here, when Macduff kills him and enters the stage 
with Macbeth’s head on the tip of his sword. In becoming an object, a head, a proof, Macbeth 
completes the cycle of subject-object transformation that began with Tarquin. 
 Shakespearean tragedy repeatedly stages a complex interplay between subjects and 
objects, people and things, encounters which we may choose to read as threatening or 
productive. To accomplish the former, we read as we are accustomed to doing, from an 
anthropocentric perspective; to arrive at the latter, we must look to the interactions between 
human and nature, not simply for the ways in which one actor reflects or reveals truths about 
another, but for evidence of a multi-directional, osmotic flow of ideas, intents, and agency. We 
must not use objects as a bridge back to humanity, not see the dagger as it marshals us the way 
that we were going. Instead, we must look to the ligatures between the living and non-living 
worlds to reveal the silent histories. The trouble is, when we place the objects on the dissection 
table and open them up, more often than not, we end up revealing ourselves in them. “In the 
end,” writes Yates, “history figures a human face, for it is the irreducible rhythms of our bodies 
that are its occasion” (207). The dagger did, after all, come out of Macbeth. Tarquin was a 
human being before he became a specter-thing. Latour’s ‘Parliament of Things’ can never truly 
be a council of objects apart from human meaning, for humans invented the idea of parliament; 
for things to have their own parliament, they must behave like humans. But in allowing things 
and humans to create meaning together, we dispel the sinister implications of agentive objects 
and learn to reconfigure our own histories to include them. 
  
Notes 
I joyously extend my gratitude to Sara Munson Deats at the University of South Florida, Lisa S. 
Starks at the University of South Florida, St. Petersburg, and Julian Yates at the University of 
Delaware for their generous donations of time, encouragement, and brilliance. 
 
1
 In saying that Tarquin ‘haunts’ the tragedies, I refer to the double meaning of the word 
as elucidated by Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass in Renaissance Clothing and the 
Materials of Memory. The authors identify ‘haunting’ as both “an action that suggests familiarity 
and habit [and] an action that suggests profound disturbance and the shattering of habit” (260-
62). Like Freud’s ‘das Unheimliche’, ‘haunting’ is both known and unknown, desire and terror, 
repetition and rift (Freud 347). Thus, Tarquin’s presence in the tragedies both resurrects a 
familiar (albeit unwelcome) figure from Roman history and testifies to the time’s disjointedness. 
2
 In her examination of Lycidas, Lauren Shohet uses this term to describe Yates’ method 
of reading history.  
3
 For a more complete discussion of the way humans have silenced nature, see 
Christopher Manes, “Nature and Silence” in The Ecocriticism Reader, ed. by Cheryll Glotfelty 
and Harold Fromm (London: U of Georgia P, 1996) 15-29. 
4
 All quotes from Shakespeare’s texts are from the Norton edition, edited by Stephen 
Greenblatt (1997). 
5
 For a detailed discussion of the ways in which Early Modern objects, perhaps 
agentively, distance themselves from their human creators, see Margreta de Grazia’s contribution 
to Subject and Object in Renaissance Culture.  
6
 The Rape of Lucrece also alludes to Philomel, who was raped by her brother-in-law, 
Tereus, who then imprisoned her and cut out her tongue to prevent her from revealing his crime. 
Instead, she wove a tapestry displaying her story and presented it to her sister, who murdered her 
son and fed him to Tereus. According to Ovid, all three figures metamorphosed into birds. Once, 
the narrator describes Lucrece as ‘lamenting Philomel’ and once she gives a bird this name.  
 
 7
 The equation of Tarquin with violence and rape is an important one, as all of the 
murders associated with Tarquin are highly sexualized: Brutus’ stabbing of Caesar has obvious 
homoerotic overtones and Macbeth’s murder of Duncan proves his virility to his wife.  
8
 Cicero is alone in his attribution of agency and intent to the unnatural events; Casca 
meets up with Cassius shortly after leaving the skeptical orator. Cassius says of the storms, 
“Heaven hath infused them with these spirits / To make them instruments of fear and warning / 
Unto some monstrous state” (70-71). Cassius, however, elsewhere discredits belief in 
superstition, as when he famously declares to Brutus that the “fault” is not “in our stars, / But in 
ourselves” (I.ii.141-42). It seems likely that in the scene with Casca, Cassius employs the current 
weather situation in his campaign against Caesar, intending to persuade Casca to join the 
conspirators. 
9
 When Antony addresses the Romans at Caesar’s funeral, he discusses Caesar’s wounds 
at great length for the crowd. In an interesting moment, he tells the story of Brutus’ ‘unkindest 
cut’, when Caesar’s blood followed Brutus’ sword as it left his body “as rushing out of doors to 
be resolved / If Brutus so unkindly knocked or no” (III.ii.174). Caesar’s blood, too, has its own 
intentions. This parallels Lucrece’s suicide, when Marcus Brutus’ ancestor pulls the knife from 
her body “and as it left the place / Her blood in poor revenge held it in chase” (Lucrece 1735-36). 
10
 The idea of agentive objects as specters merits consideration; for more, see Jacques 
Derrida, Specters of Marx, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
11
 Philippa Berry gives an illuminating analysis of the links between the destruction of 
linear time and the usurpation of male authority in Shakespeare’s Feminine Endings (London: 
Routledge, 1999) 102-134. 
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